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Abstract
Price stickiness plays a decisive role in many macroeconomic mod-
els, yet why prices are sticky remains a puzzle. We develop a micro-
economic model in which two competing Þrms are free to set prices,
but face uncertainty about the state of demand. With some proba-
bility, there is a positive demand shock, which is observed but by one
Þrm. In equilibrium, only the informed Þrm adjusts its price after the
shock, while the uninformed Þrm raises its price only with a delay,
after observing the price of its competitor. Hence, prices are sticky in
the sense that one Þrms price does not adjust immediately. Further,
if getting information is costly, the model implies that the larger Þrm
tends to be better informed and to adjust its price Þrst.
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1 Introduction
Both casual and systematic evidence suggest Þrms do not change prices very
frequently.1 While there exist various theories trying to explain sluggish price
adjustment (e.g. by assuming menu costs), economists generally agree that
the question remains a puzzle. Of course, the observation of prices remaining
the same over time does not yet prove that prices are sticky. After all, as
long as no change occurs in the economy, even completely ßexible prices will
not change. Thus, the idea of price stickiness must refer to the way in which
prices adjust to a change in the economy. In particular, stickiness invokes the
idea that adjustment is slow compared to some hypothetical benchmark in
which all Þrms adjust prices immediately. Price stickiness, therefore, means
that adjustment of prices is incomplete in the sense that not all Þrms adjust
prices immediately after a change has come. Some Þrms set a new price,
while others somehow wait and see and adjust their price only after a while.
Without recurring to irrationality, price stickiness thus understood can be
explained in two different ways. Due to costs associated directly with price
adjustment, Þrms may prefer not to alter prices after a change even if they
are perfectly aware of the change. Alternatively, Þrms may not adjust prices
because they face uncertainty the reduction of which is costly. While New
Keynesian models typically stress direct adjustment costs, our focus in this
paper is on the issue of uncertainty and costs of information acquisition.2
Of course, some prices are perfectly ßexible, since they are determined in
organized exchange markets that come close to the Walrasian model. But
it is also an empirical fact that many prices are set by Þrms. Typically,
consumer prices belong to the latter category. Obviously, when discussing
price stickiness, one has to focus on prices that are set. Understanding why
Þrms do not adjust prices more frequently therefore requires a theory of
how Þrms set prices, which requires abandoning the idea of a Walrasian
auctioneer. Unfortunately, price setting in markets with homogeneous goods
is susceptible to anomalies such as the Bertrand paradox. In our view, the
difficulties in modelling price setting constitute an important impediment to
a better understanding of sticky prices.
In this paper, we develop a simple microeconomic model in which two
1See e.g. Kashyap (1995) or Blinder et al. (1998).
2See e.g. Ball and Romer (1991) or Ball and Mankiw (1994) for a Keynesian perspective.
Meltzer (1995) and Brunner and Meltzer (1993) emphasize the importance of uncertainty
and of costs of acquiring information.
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competing Þrms are free to set prices, but face uncertainty about the state of
demand. This uncertainty takes the following form. With some probability,
there is a positive demand shock, which is observed but by one Þrm. In this
setting, we derive three main results. First, we show that only the informed
Þrm adjusts its price after a positive demand shock, while the price of the
uninformed Þrm remains the same as without the shock. The uninformed
Þrms price is, then, sticky in the sense that it does not immediately adjust
to a change in demand. Our framework thus allows both for a deÞnition
what price rigidity means and for an explanation why it occurs. Second, we
assume that demand remains the same in a second period in which Þrms can
set prices anew. By observing the competitors price of the Þrst period, the
previously uninformed Þrm will then learn the state of demand and adjust its
price in the case of a positive demand shock. Hence, the informed Þrm is what
is called a barometric price leader in the literature of industrial organization.3
Third, we extend the model by assuming that, before setting prices in the Þrst
period, each Þrm is given the opportunity to invest into a technology which
reveals the true state of demand. Our model then implies that information
is more valuable for the Þrm with the larger quantity. Hence, larger Þrms
are more inclined to invest into information acquisition, and smaller Þrms
are more likely to be uninformed and to exhibit sluggish price adjustment.
In order to evade the difficulties with price competition that are well
known since Bertrand (1883), we separate Þrms production and selling ac-
tivities in time. Firms have to produce Þrst. Then they carry the quantities
produced to the market place, where they observe the quantity produced by
the competitor. Then, after one Þrm has learnt the true state of demand,
they simultaneously set prices. This sequential structure ensures that there
is a lower (and non-zero) bound for the prices Þrms consider setting: No Þrm,
be it informed or not, sets a price below the market clearing price on the low
demand (i.e. the demand in the absence of a positive shock). Still, if demand
is not sufficiently elastic, the price setting game need not have an equilibrium.
After all, it might pay a Þrm to set a higher price and to risk throwing away
quantity it cannot sell, in which case the Bertrand logic would apply again.
However, if quantities have to be removed from the market place at some
costs, this strategy does not pay, and the price setting game has a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium which is unique as far as prices set in equilibrium and
payoffs are concerned.
3See Cooper (1997).
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On the one hand, our paper is related to the industrial organization lit-
erature dealing with price setting and imperfect competition. In particular,
we share with Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and with Stahl (1988) the idea
of sequential structuring. On the other hand, prices in our model reveal in-
formation as in Walrasian models. Our paper can be seen as an attempt to
incorporate informational costs in the spirit of Meltzer (1995) into a model
in which Þrms set prices.
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we introduce the price
setting game and derive our main results. Section 3 sketches an extension of
the basic model by incorporating investment into market research technology.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The Price Setting Game
2.1 Structure of the Basic Model
In the basic model, we consider the following set up. There are two Þrms
j ∈ {1, 2} which procude a homogeneous good. We assume that production
and market places are separated through time and space, so that Þrms have
to produce Þrst, then carry the goods to the market place where they can
sell their products. This separation of production and market makes sure
that Þrms cannot further increase the quantity they wish to sell, once they
are selling on the market. Further, we assume that there are two periods
t ∈ {1, 2} on the market place and that the state of demand is the same for
both periods. We consider only the sellers problem and treat production
as exogenous. Hence, we explore the price setting game for given quantities
q1 and q2 of the two Þrms, where we assume that these quantities are the
same for both periods. We also assume that the good is perishable such that
quantities cannot be shifted across time.
The two Þrms face a stochastic demand, which is the same in both periods.
With probability α, there is no shock, and demand is low for both periods.
With probability (1− α), there is a positive demand shock at the beginning
of the Þrst period, in which case demand is high for both periods. Let QD(p)
denote the aggregate demand function, which is either
QDH(p) = Q
D (p)
4
in case of high demand or
QDL (p) = max
n
QD (p + ε) , 0
o
in case of low demand, where QD (.) is a twice differentiable, monotonically
decreasing and weakly concave function and ε is a parameter which captures
the magnitude of the demand shock.
On the market place, the two Þrms observe the quantities produced and
engage in price competition. In each period t ∈ {1, 2}, they set prices si-
multaneously. While they are free to set any price they like, they remain
committed to that price for the remainder of the period. Thus, prices are
legal offers that oblige a Þrm to sell its whole stock if customers want to buy
it at that price. If they like, Þrms may change the price for the second period.
However, they cannot leave their unsold goods on the market. If Þrms do
not sell the whole quantity they have brought with them, they have to carry
the excess quantity from the market at constant marginal removal costs γ.
We assume that this is the case for both periods.
Since Þrms need not set the same prices, we have to make an assump-
tion on rationing. In the case where prices are different and the low price
offer cannot satiate the entire demand, we have to specify which consumers
are attracted by the seller with the lower and by the seller with the higher
price. That is, we need a rationing rule which gives us the residual de-
mand function, i.e. the part of the demand remaining for the Þrm with the
higher price. Throughout this paper, we assume that an efficient rationing
rule applies. Therefore, supposing that aggregate demand is QD (.) and that
Þrm j ∈ {1, 2} sets the higher price pj > p−j, the residual demand func-
tion QDR (pj, p−j, q−j) of Þrm j is given by max
n
QD (pj)− q−j, 0
o
.4 Figure
1 plots demand and residual demand of Þrm 1 for linear demand functions,
where pL and pH denote the prices for which the low respectively high de-
mand clears for a given supply QS ≡ q1 + q2. These market clearing prices
are implicitly determined by QDL (pL) = Q
D
H(pH) = Q
S.
Finally, we assume the following structure of information. Before the
beginning of the Þrst period, the Þrms do not know the state of demand, but
the probabilities of the two states are common knowledge. At the beginning
of the Þrst period, one Þrm learns the true state of demand before setting
the price for that period. For the time being, we assume that this Þrm
is randomly chosen by nature. We will discuss how the emergence of an
4See Tirole (2000) for a discussion of these rationing rules.
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Figure 1: Demand and residual demand of Þrm 1
informed and an uninformed Þrm can be explained endogenously in section
3. When they set their prices, both Þrms are aware of which one knows the
state of demand. When the market closes at the end of period 1, the Þrms
can in addition observe the price and any unsold quantity of the other Þrm.
The two Þrms are risk neutral and maximize the total expected proÞt
from both periods. The available information of the Þrms is asymmetric:
while the informed Þrm can condition the price on the state of demand,
the uninformed Þrm cannot. Hence, the Þrms face a two period game of
incomplete information, in which the two states low and high demand can
be interpreted as the two possible types of the informed Þrm. Since by
observing its competitors Þrst period price, the uninformed Þrm receives a
signal on the competitors type, the game shares the essential characteristics
of a signaling game. There are, however, two differences between our game
and standard signaling games. First, both the sender (the informed Þrm)
and the receiver (the uninformed Þrm) act in both periods. That is, the
uninformed (informed) Þrm also sets a price in the Þrst (second) period.
Second, the receiver gets additional information by observing any unsold
quantities of the informed Þrm.
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A strategy of the uninformed Þrm (Þrm u henceforth) consists of choosing
a price for each period, where the latter price can be conditioned on the
price of the informed Þrm (Þrm i henceforth) in the Þrst period. On the
other hand, a strategy of Þrm i is given by a pair of prices (one for each
state of demand) for period 1 and a pair of prices for period 2.5 Let σI
= {pIL,1, pIH,1, pIL,2, pIH,2} and σU = {pU,1, pU,2 (pI,1, I)} be the strategies of
Þrm i and Þrm u. By pIH,t and pIL,t, we denote the prices set by Þrm i if
demand is high and low, respectively, while pU,t is the price set by Þrm u,
t ∈ {1, 2} indicates the time period, pI,1 is the observed Þrst period price of
Þrm i, and I is an indicator function which deserves a few comments. Recall
that prices are assumed to be legal offers that oblige the offering Þrm to sell
the whole quantity if customers are willing to buy it at that price, so that the
quantity a Þrm can sell is not a separate choice variable for that Þrm. Also,
we have assumed that unsold quantities are observables. In particular, Þrm
u can observe any Þrst period quantity Þrm i cannot sell. Therefore, if Þrm i
sets pI,1 > pL, Þrm u can infer the true state of demand from observing prices
and removed quantities. An indicator function I can hence be deÞned with
the following properties: I = 0 if demand can be inferred to be high, and
I = 1 if demand can be inferred to be low or if demand cannot be inferred.
To capture the beliefs of Þrm u, we further denote by µ (pI,1, I) the
probability with which the uninformed Þrm believes demand is low condi-
tional on having observed pI,1 and eventual removed quantities. Quite clearly,
then, for pI,1 > pL the only beliefs consistent with the observations pI,1 are
µ∗(pI,1, I) = I. However, if pI,1 ≤ pL and if pU,1 ≤ pL, no such certainty can
be reached, since no quantities are removed for either state of demand, and
thus any beliefs are consistent with the observations. In the next subsection,
we show that this game has a simple Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE)
with a unique equilibrium path.6
2.2 Equilibrium
Essentially, a PBE consists of a proÞle of strategies and a set of beliefs, such
that at every information set of the game, the strategy of each Þrm maximizes
5In principle, the informed Þrm might also condition its second period prices on the
Þrst period price of the uninformed Þrm. But since the uninformed has only one type and
therefore nothing to reveal, there is no reason to do so.
6In our game, the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria coincides with the set of sequential
equilibria. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Theorem 8.2).
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its expected proÞt given the set of beliefs and the other players subsequent
strategy. In addition, beliefs are derived from equilibrium strategies and are
updated according to Bayes rule where possible. DeÞning
γ = max {γ1, γ2} ,
where
γ1 = −
 ∂QDL (p)
∂p
¯¯¯¯
¯
p=pL
−1 max {q1,q2}
α
− pL (1)
γ2 =
(1− α)ε
α
− pL (2)
and focusing on pure strategies, we can prove the following result: If removal
costs γ exceed γ, then in any PBE, Þrm i sets market clearing prices pL
(pH) in both periods if demand is low (high), and Þrm u sets its Þrst period
price to pL, while its second period price mimics the Þrst period price of
the informed Þrm. The only potential difference between equilibria is off the
equilibrium path: Firm u may have various beliefs, giving rise to various
second period prices, if the Þrm i set a Þrst period price below pL, which,
however, in equilibrium never happens.
Formally, this is stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If γ ≥ γ, the only pure strategy proÞles and beliefs that
constitute a PBE are
σ∗I = {pL, pH , pL, pH} , σ∗U =
n
pL, p
∗
U,2(pI,1, I)
o
and µ∗ (pI,1, I)
where ∀ pI,1 ≥ pL,
µ∗ (pI,1, I) = and p∗U,2 (pI,1, I) = pLI + pH (1− I) ,
and ∀ pI,1 < pL, any beliefs µ∗ (pI,1, I) ≥ α, implying p∗U,2 (pI,1, I) = pLI +
pH (1− I) , can occur in equilibrium, while beliefs µ∗ (pI,1, I) < α are only
admissible if they imply second period prices p∗U,2 (pI,1, I) < 2pL − pI,1.
To prove the proposition, we Þrst consider a hypothetical reduced game
in which there is only one period, such that any signaling interactions can be
neglected. In this reduced game, the strategy of Þrm i consists of choosing
two prices pIL and pIH , whereas Þrm u simply has to set a price pU . For this
reduced game, the following lemmata can be established:
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Lemma 1 Suppose γ > γ1. Then if demand is low, Þrm i strictly prefers
to lower its price pIL for any pIL ∈ {pIL | pIL > pL, pIL ≥ pU} , and if de-
mand is high, Þrm i strictly prefers to lower its price pIH for any pIH ∈
{pIH | pIH > pH , pIH ≥ pU} .
Lemma 2 If γ > γ and for any beliefs µ ≥ α, Þrm u strictly prefers to
lower its price pU for any pU ∈ {pU | pU > pL, pU ≥ pIL, pU ≤ pH} or any
pU ∈ {pU | pU ≥ max (pH , pIL, pIH)}.
Though the proofs are rather tedious and therefore relegated to Appen-
dices A and B, the mechanism at work is quite intuitive. Basically, the same
mechanism applies throughout the price setting game. We begin with a brief
comment on the role of removal costs. Consider, for example, Lemma 1.
First, it should be noted that due to efficient rationing, Þrm i cannot sell its
whole quantity qI if demand is low and whenever pIL > pL and pIL ≥ pU .
Therefore, under prices such as these, Þrm i will have to throw part of its
quantity away, which will obviously not pay if removing quantity from the
market is sufficiently costly. The basic role of removal costs is thus to make
deviation from a market clearing price unattractive. It should be noted, how-
ever, that these costs are not necessarily needed (i.e. need not be positive):
If low demand is elastic at pL, there is no incentive for Þrm i to set a price pIL
higher than pL, regardless of Þrm us strategy, since revenue decreases with
a higher price. What is behind Lemma 1, then, is a version of the mecha-
nism uncovered by Bertrand: Whenever Þrm i considers setting a price above
the one of its competitor and if these prices are such that Þrm i cannot sell
everything (that is, if prices are above pL or pH), it pays Þrm i to decrease
its price. A similar argument applies for Þrm u in Lemma 2.
Based on Lemma 1 and 2, we can then prove our main result stated in
Proposition 1. The proof, which is basically an iterated application of Lemma
1 and 2, is relegated to Appendix C. We present the proof in six steps.
First, since a Bertrand like mechanism implies that no prices above pH
or between pL and pH can prevail in equilibrium, it can be shown that there
exists no pooling equilibrium. Second, as a consequence of this, Þrm u learns
the state of demand by observing Þrst period prices, such that in equilibrium,
both Þrms are informed in the second period. By virtue of Lemma 1, second
period equilibrium prices must be pL (pH) if demand is low (high) in any
PBE and for any Þrst period equilibrium price of Þrm i. Third, speaking
somewhat loosely, Þrm i will therefore set Þrst period prices which were
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optimal in a one period game. Lemma 1 and 2 then imply that in the
Þrst period, Þrm u sets pL , while Þrm i sets pL (pH) if demand is low
(high) in any equilibrium. What remains to be speciÞed is the equilibrium
reaction function p∗U,2( pI,1, I) for off equilibrium prices pI,1. Note that for off
equilibrium prices pI,1 > pL, Þrm u will become informed about the state of
demand after the Þrst period, such that in the second period, Þrm u would
set pL (pH) if demand is low (high). This is shown in step 4. Fifth, for
off equilibrium prices pI,1 < pL, Þrm u cannot infer the state of demand.
Therefore, there are some degrees of freedom for the equilibrium reaction
function p∗U,2( pI,1, I) for off equilibrium prices pI,1 < pL. However, even for
such prices, only beliefs implying p∗U,2( pI,1, I) ≤ 2pL − pI,1 are consistent
with equilibrium. Otherwise, Þrm i would be tempted to set such a price
pI,1 < pL, which cannot be part of an equilibrium. Step 1 to 5 exclude
all equilibrium candidates other than those stated in Proposition 1. What
remains to be shown, therefore, is that the strategies and beliefs constitute
a PBE. This is done in our Þnal step. The only difference of equilibria
lying in off equilibrium beliefs and behavior, payoffs and observable prices
are identical across all equilibria. Hence, the game has a unique equilibrium
path.
We would like to emphasize that despite being complicated when dealt
with in detail, the equilibrium outcome of the game is fairly simple. In the
Þrst period, the uninformed Þrm always sets pL, while the informed Þrm sets
pL if demand is low and pH if demand is high. In the second period, both
Þrms set pL if demand is low and pH if demand is high. Thus, our model
exhibits price stickiness in the sense that one Þrm sets a new price after a
positive demand shock, while the other one follows a price policy of wait
and see and adjusts its price only after a while.
3 Information Acquisition
A natural extension of the model is to endogenize the appropriation of in-
formation at the beginning of the Þrst period. We now make the following
assumptions: Either Þrm can invest an amount F in market research, in
which case the Þrm learns the true state of demand before setting the price
for the Þrst period. If no Þrm invests, we assume again that one Þrm learns
demand by chance, where the a priori probability of becoming informed is 1
2
.
Thus, investment provides information with certainty.
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For any given quantities and if only one Þrm invests, we know from Section
2 that the informed Þrm sets pL (pH) in both periods if demand is low (high),
whereas the uninformed Þrm sets pL in the Þrst period and pLI + pH(1− I)
in the second period. If both Þrms invest, it follows immediately that both
Þrms set pL (pH) in both periods if demand is low (high). Finally, if no Þrm
invests, one Þrm learns demand by chance, which leads to the same result as
the game where only one Þrm invests.
The expected value for Þrm j ∈ {1, 2} of being informed with certainty
is then simply 1−α
2
(pH − pL) qj = 1−α2 εqj. A risk-neutral proÞt maximizing
Þrm, therefore, would invest in market research whenever the gain from doing
so exceeds the costs F. Moreover, for a given F and for q1 6= q2, the Þrm with
the greater quantity is more inclined to invest in market research because the
value of being informed is increasing in qj . While the Þrm with the smaller
quantity invests if F < F = 1−α
2
εmin {q1, q2}, the seller with the larger
quantity invests whenever F < F = 1−α
2
εmax {q1, q2} . Hence, if quantities
are not identical and F ∈
h
F, F
i
, the Þrm with the larger quantity invests
and the other one does not. Under the assumption F ∈
h
F , F
i
, our extended
model predicts that large Þrms are better informed about demand and act
as a price leader.
4 Discussion
We have presented a Non-Walrasian model in which two Þrms set prices
under asymmetric information about demand. If there is a positive demand
shock, the informed Þrm raises its price, whereas the other Þrm learns about
the shock only by observing its competitors price and thus adjusts its own
price in the next period. Thus, the uninformed Þrms price is sticky insofar
as it does not immediately react to a change in demand. If Þrms can choose
whether to acquire information at some Þx cost, the Þrm with the larger
quantity has stronger incentives to become informed. Therefore, prices of
larger Þrms tend to move Þrst if demand increases, which is an empirically
testable hypothesis. Due to this prediction, the model escapes the criticism
of Blinder et al. (1998) who argue that existing theories of sticky prices
are epistemologically empty. In addition, the popular term market leader is
given a natural meaning. A market leader is not only a large Þrm, but also,
and maybe more importantly, the Þrm that adjusts its price Þrst, because it
11
is better informed.
Throughout the paper, we have treated quantities as exogenous data for
the Þrms (sellers). This may be a reasonable assumption in the short run
once the products are on the market, but in longer terms Þrms typically
are engaged in production. A natural extension, therefore, would seem to
introduce production in a stage previous to the price setting game. While
this is possible, we do not think that it is a particularly useful endeavour,
since we do not gain any additional insight into why prices seem to be sticky.
Price stickiness is reßected solely by the fact that not all Þrms set the market
clearing price on the high demand after a positive demand shock, whatever
quantities Þrms have produced. Further, the model could be extended to
include more than two Þrms. Again, we conjecture that the mechanics would
remain the same and the gain from this extension would thus not be sub-
stantial. Informed Þrms would adjust immediately, while uninformed Þrms
would wait and see.
In our view, uncertainty and costs of information are crucial to under-
stand why prices are sticky. Menu costs, taken literally as direct costs of
setting a new price, would have to be implausibly large to account for the
price stickiness of our model. Uncertainty and costs of information, on the
other hand, seem to be more fundamental frictions. Depending on Þrm spe-
ciÞc variables such as Þrm size, the decision to remain uninformed may be
completely rational. In our model, this is what makes prices sticky: Þrms do
not adjust prices because they lack information.
If costs of information play a crucial role, they deserve explicit treatment.
This paper is an attempt to model the role of information in the context of
price competition. Of course, the fact that in our model prices are only
adjusted in one direction may be seen as a shortcoming of the model. It is,
however, a consequence of the difficulties that arise as one leaves the Þction
of a Walrasian auctioneer. Further research on the microstructure of markets
will hopefully help to reduce problems such as these.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
To prove Lemma 1, we treat the price pU of Þrm u as given and show that
removal costs of γ1 are sufficient to ensure that the revenue of Þrm i is strictly
decreasing in pIL for any pIL ∈ {pIL | pIL > pL, pIL ≥ pU} if demand is low
and strictly decreasing in pIH for any pIH ∈ {pIH | pIH > pH , pIH ≥ pU} if
demand is high. Together, this proves the lemma. We now consider the two
cases of low and high demand separately. Throughout the proofs, we denote
by pmaxL (p
max
H ) the prices for which the demanded quantity becomes zero in
case of low (high) demand.
A.1 Low Demand
First, note that raising the price pIL above pmaxL is never preferable (being
strictly dominated by pIL = pL). Now, since the residual demand is binding
whenever demand is low and the informed Þrm sets pIL ≥ max(pL, pU), the
revenue of Þrm i is³
QDL (pIL)− qU
´
pIL − γ
³
qI −QDL (pIL) + qU
´
.
Differentiating revenue with respect to pIL yields7
∂QDL (pIL)
∂pIL
pIL +
³
QDL (pIL)− qU
´
+ γ
∂QDL (pIL)
∂pIL
, (3)
for any pIL < pmaxL , and the second derivative
∂2QDL (pIL)
∂p2IL
pU + 2
∂QDL (pIL)
∂pIL
+ γ
∂2QDL (pIL)
∂p2IL
is negative because ∂
2QDL (p)
∂2p
≤ 0 by assumption. This implies that if (3) is
negative at pIL = pL, then it is negative for any pIL up to pmaxL . Next, the
derivative (3) evaluated at pIL = pL is negative if and only if
γ > −
 ∂QDL (p)
∂p
¯¯¯¯
¯
p=pL
−1 qI − pL, (4)
7More precisely, if pIL = pL, this is only the right hand side derivative, but since it
does not affect any proofs, we will neglect that remark in the remaining discussion.
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(note that if pIL = pL, we can replace QDL (pIL) − qU by qI). Since α < 1
and max(q1,q2) ≥ qI , it follows from (1) that condition (4) is certainly met if
γ > γ1. This proves the Þrst part of Lemma 1.
A.2 High Demand
Again, any pIH ≥ pmaxH is strictly dominated by pIH = pH , so we restrict
attention to pIH < pmaxH . If demand is high and pIH ≥ max(pH , pU), the
proÞt of Þrm i is³
QDH(pIH)− qU
´
pIH − γ
³
qI −QDH(pIH) + qU
´
.
Proceeding the same way as in the previous subsection, it can be shown that
if the derivative
∂QDH(pIH)
∂pIH
pIH +
³
QDH(pIH)− qU
´
+ γ
∂QDH(pIH)
∂pIH
(5)
is negative for pIH = pH , which is the case if and only if
γ > −
 ∂QDH(p)
∂p
¯¯¯¯
¯
p=pH
−1 qI − pH , (6)
then it is negative for any pIH up to pmaxH . Due to pL < pH and
∂QDH(p)
∂p
¯¯¯¯
p=pH
=
∂QDL (p)
∂p
¯¯¯¯
p=pL
, restriction (6) is weaker than (4), hence it is also satisÞed if
γ > γ1. Therefore, Þrm i strictly prefers to lower its price for any pIH ∈
{pIH | pIH > pH , pIH ≥ pU} if γ > γ1. Q.E.D.
B Proof of Lemma 2
For Þrm u, the reasoning is slightly more complicated, since its expected rev-
enue depends on the belief µ.8 We proof the lemma in three steps presented
below. First, we show that the derivative of Þrm us revenu with respect to pU
is strictly negative for any pU ≥ max (pH , pIL, pIH) . Then we show that Þrm
u prefers to lower pU for any pU ∈ {pU | pU > pL, pU ≥ pIL, pU ≤ pH} , where
we distinguish between the two cases pH < pmaxL and pH < p
max
L . Together,
this proves the lemma.
8Of course, in a reduced one period game or in period 1, the only reasonable belief µ is
the objective probability α, but we keep the presentation more general for later purposes.
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B.1 Prices above pH
For this part of the proof, we draw on the proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix A. If
the uninformed Þrm sets a price pU that exceeds pH and is at least pIL and at
least pIH , the derivative of its expected revenue with respect to pU consists of
two components: The Þrst (and low demand part) component is µ times
the derivative expressed in (3) or zero, while the second (high demand)
part can be computed as (1 − µ) multiplied by the derivative in equation
(5).9 Since we have shown above that the assumption γ > γ1 is sufficient to
ensure that both derivatives (3) and (5) are strictly negative for any price
above pH (unless for dominated prices which imply a zero revenue), it follows
that the derivative of Þrm u, which is some average of the two, is also strictly
negative. Thus, Þrm u prefers to lower pU whenever pU ≥ max (pH , pIL, pIH).
B.2 Prices below pH if pH < pmaxL
Next, assume pH < pmaxL , as will be the case for a sufficiently large quantity
Q. If Þrm u sets some pU ∈ {pU | pU > pL, pU ≥ pIL, pU ≤ pH} , the quantity
sold is given by the residual demand QDRL (pU , qI) = Q
D
L (pU)− qI if demand
is low and by qU if demand is high. Hence, the expected revenue of Þrm u is
µ
³
QDL (pU)− qI
´
pU − µγ
³
qU −QDL (pU) + qI
´
+ (1− µ)qUpU (7)
Differentiating with respect to pU yields
µ
"
∂QDL (pU)
∂pU
pU +Q
D
L (pU)− qI + γ
∂QDL (pU)
∂pU
#
+ (1− µ)qU , (8)
and the second derivative
µ
"
∂2QDL (pU)
∂p2U
pU + 2
∂QDL (pU)
∂pU
+ γ
∂2QDL (pU)
∂p2U
#
is again strictly negative because of ∂
2QDL (p)
∂2p
≤ 0. Therefore, if the Þrst
derivative (8) is negative at pU = pL, then it must be so for any higher pU
up to pH . Noticing that pU = pL implies by deÞnition QDL (pU)− qI = qU , (8)
evaluated at pU = pL is
µ
 ∂QDL (p)
∂p
¯¯¯¯
¯
p=pL
pL + γ
∂QDL (p)
∂p
¯¯¯¯
¯
p=pL
+ qU ,
9Except that, of course, pIL or pIH have to be replaced by pU .
16
which is negative if γ exceeds the critical threshold
γ > −
 ∂QDL (p)
∂p
¯¯¯¯
¯
p=pL
−1 qU
µ
− pL. (9)
From the deÞnition in (1) it is straightforward to recognize that the restriction
(9) is satisÞed for any µ ≥ α if γ > γ1, implying that Þrm u clearly prefers
to lower pU .
B.3 Prices below pH if pH > pmaxL
Now, consider the case pH > pmaxL . If pU ∈ {pU | pU > pL, pU ≥ pIL, pU ≤ pH}
and in the range pU ≤ pmaxL , Þrm us revenue is still given by (7). As we have
shown in the previous section, revenue is therefore strictly decreasing in pU
up to pmaxL if γ > γ1.
Turning to prices pU ∈ {pU | pU > pL, pU ≥ pIL, pU ≤ pH} but above pmaxL ,
it is never optimal to set a price higher than pmaxL , unless the price is pH , since
by raising pU , Þrm u beneÞts in case of high demand without losing anything
in case of low demand. Hence, in this case pU = pH is the only alternative
to setting pL that we could not exclude so far. In a next step, we compare
revenues from setting pH and pL. Given belief µ, Þrm u strictly prefers
pU = pL to any pU ∈ {pU | pU > pL, pU ≥ pIL, pU ≤ pH} if
pLqU > (1− µ)pHqU − µγqU .
Since pH = pL + ε, the above condition transforms to
γ >
(1− µ)
µ
ε− pL.
If γ exceeds γ2 deÞned in (2), the above condition is met for any µ ≥ α.
Thus, γ > γ ensures that also if pH > pmaxL , Þrm u strictly prefers to lower pU
whenever pU ∈ {pU | pU > pL, pU ≥ pIL, pU ≤ pH} . Together with the results
of the previous subsections, this proves Lemma 2. Q.E.D.
C Proof of Proposition 1
We prove Proposition 1 in six steps. To economize on notation, we drop the
argument I in the functions p∗U,2(pI,1, I) and µ(pI,1, I).
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Step 1: There exists no pooling equilibrium, i.e. no PBE with p∗IL,1 = p
∗
IH,1.
Proof: To prove this claim, suppose to the contrary that there exists an
equilibrium in which Þrm i sets p∗IL,1 = p
∗
IH,1 = p
∗
I,1. In this case, the beliefs
of Þrm u are µ(p∗I,1) = α if the equilibrium price p
∗
I,1 is observed. We then
show that for any p∗I,1 and any p
∗
U,1, the only second period prices p
∗
IL,2, p
∗
IH,2
and p∗U,2(p
∗
I,1) that could prevail in equilibrium are p
∗
IL,2 = p
∗
U,2(p
∗
I,1) = pL
and p∗IH,2 = pH . But from this follows that p
∗
I,1 = p
∗
IL,1 = p
∗
IH,1 cannot be a
PBE, which proves the above claim.
We Þrst turn to the case of low demand and show that in any pooling
equilibrium, only p∗IL,2 = pL can be part of an equilibrium. To see why,
note that since prices in the last period bear no consequences on the future,
any p∗IL,2 < pL is strictly dominated and can therefore be excluded. Suppose,
instead, that p∗IL,2 > pL is chosen in equilibrium together with some p
∗
U,2(p
∗
I,1).
If p∗IL,2 ≥ p∗U,2(p∗I,1), this cannot be an equilibrium, because from Lemma 1
we know that Þrm i would like to lower its price. However, for any p∗IH,2,
pL < p
∗
IL,2 < p
∗
U,2(p
∗
I,1) cannot occur in equilibrium either: If p
∗
IH,2 ≤ pH
and given beliefs µ(p∗I,1) = α, Lemma 2 implies that Þrm u should lower its
price. If, on the other hand, p∗IH,2 > pH , then by virtue of Lemma 1, Þrm i
would prefer to lower p∗IH,2 if p
∗
IH,2 > p
∗
U,2.), and in the opposite case where
pH < p
∗
IH,2 ≤ p∗U,2(p∗I,1), Lemma 2 implies that Þrm u would prefer to lower
its price. Hence, setting p∗IL,2 > pL is inconsistent with equilibrium behavior,
leaving p∗IL,2 = pL as the only equilibrium candidate.
An equivalent reasoning establishes that only p∗U,2(p
∗
I,1) = pL can prevail in
equilibrium: Any strategy σ∗U in which p
∗
U,2(p
∗
I,1) < pL is strictly dominated,
whereas p∗U,2(p
∗
I,1) > pL can be excluded for the following reasons: Either, if
p∗IH,2 ≤ pH and p∗U,2(p∗I,1) ≥ p∗IL,2 or if p∗IH,2 > pH and p∗IH,2 ≤ p∗U,2(p∗I,1), Þrm
u should lower p∗U,2(p
∗
I,1) (see Lemma 2). Or, Þrm i would prefer to decrease
p∗IL,2 if p
∗
IH,2 ≤ pH and p∗U,2(p∗I,1) < p∗IL,2 or to decrease p∗IH,2 if p∗IH,2 > pH
and p∗IH,2 > p
∗
U,2(p
∗
I,1) (see Lemma 1).
Next, any p∗IH,2 6= pH can also be excluded in equilibrium: Strict domi-
nance reasons exclude all p∗IH,2 below pH , while the same reasoning as above
implies that there can be no equilibrium with p∗IH,2 > pH , since in this case
at least one Þrm would like to lower its second period price.
So far, we have shown that a pooling equilibrium is only compatible
with p∗IL,2 = p
∗
U,2(p
∗
I,1) = pL and p
∗
IH,2 = p
∗
U,2(p
∗
I,1) = pH . From now on,
we restrict attention to these strategies and consider whether within this
restricted strategy space, there exists any p∗I = p
∗
IL,1 = p
∗
IH,1 that could
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prevail in equilibrium for any p∗U,1. The answer is no, as we show next.
Note Þrst that p∗I,1 < pL cannot occur in equilibrium, since in combination
with p∗IL,2 = pL and p
∗
IH,2 = pH , this is strictly dominated by p
∗
I,1 = pL.
Second, suppose p∗I,1 ≥ pL but p∗I,1 < pH . Again, given p∗IL,2 = pL and
p∗IH,2 = pH , this is not compatible with equilibrium behavior, because if
demand is high, Þrm i can do better by setting p∗IH,1 = pH . Third, suppose
p∗I,1 ≥ pH and p∗U,1 ≥ p∗I,1. In combination with p∗IL,2 = pL and p∗IH,2 = pH ,
this cannot be part of a PBE, because from Lemma 2, we know that in
this case p∗U,1 cannot be an equilibrium response of Þrm u. Fourth, assume
p∗I,1 ≥ pH and p∗U,1 < p∗I,1. This cannot be a PBE with p∗IL,2 = pL and
p∗IH,2 = pH either, since Lemma 1 implies that Þrm i should lower p
∗
I,1.
Summing up, we have established that there can be no equilibrium in
which p∗IL,1 = p
∗
IH,1. Hence, any equilibrium must be of a separating nature,
in which case the informed Þrm reveals its type, i.e. the state of demand.
Step 2: In any PBE, i) µ(p∗IL,1) = 1 and µ(p
∗
IH,1) = 0, ii) p
∗
U,2(p
∗
IL,1) = pL
and p∗U,2(p
∗
IH,1) = pH , iii) p
∗
IL,2 = pL and p
∗
IH,2 = pH .
Proof: Given the separating nature of any equilibrium derived in step 1,
beliefs µ(p∗IL,1) = 1 and µ(p
∗
IH,1) = 0 follow immediately. So in equilibrium,
both Þrms know the state of demand in the second period. In this last period,
no Þrm sets a price below pL (pH) if demand is low (high), since these prices
are strictly dominated by pL (pH). But no prices above pL (pH) if demand
is low (high) can be part of an equilibrium either, because in this case, the
price of one Þrm must be at least as high as the other Þrms price. From
Lemma 1 we know that in this case, the Þrm with the weakly higher price
wants to decrease its price. Thus, only prices as speciÞed above in ii) and
iii) can occur in any PBE.
Step 3: In any PBE, i) p∗U,1 = pL , ii) p
∗
IL,1 = pL and p
∗
IH,1 = pH .
Proof: Steps 1 and 2 allow us to restrict attention to potential equilibrium
strategies in which p∗U,2(p
∗
IL,1) = pL, p
∗
U,2(p
∗
IH,1) = pH , p
∗
IL,2 = pL and p
∗
IH,2 =
pH . We now turn to Þrst period prices. Again, any p∗U,1 < pL is strictly
dominated. But in equilibrium, no p∗U,1 > pL can occur either. To see this,
assume p∗U,1 > pL together with some p
∗
IL,1 and p
∗
IH,1. If p
∗
IL,1 > p
∗
U,1 (and
p∗U,1 > pL), Lemma 1 implies that Þrm i strictly prefers a lower price p
∗
IL,1.
However, p∗IL,1 ≤ p∗U,1 (and p∗U,1 > pL) can also be excluded from equilibrium
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behavior for any p∗IH,1. Either p
∗
IH,1 ≤ pH , in which case Þrm u wants to
lower its price (see Lemma 2). Or p∗IH,1 > pH , in which case p
∗
IH,1 should
be reduced if p∗IH,1 > p
∗
U,1 (see Lemma 1) or Þrm u should decrease p
∗
U,1 if
p∗IH,1 ≤ p∗U,1 (see Lemma 2). Thus, only p∗U,1 = pL can occur in equilibrium,
as claimed in i).
Imposing the additional restriction p∗U,1 = pL on the space of equilibrium
strategy proÞles, it follows from Lemma 1 that p∗IL,1 ≤ pL and p∗IH,1 ≤ pH in
any equilibrium. Strict dominance implies p∗IL,1 ≥ pL and p∗IH,1 ≥ pH , leaving
only p∗IL,1 = pL and p
∗
IH,1 = pH as part of an equilibrium strategy of Þrm i,
as claimed in ii) above.
Step 4: In any PBE and ∀ pI,1 > pL, µ∗(pI,1) = I and p∗U,2(pI,1) = pLI +
pH (1− I).
Proof: Since Þrm u learns the state of demand whenever pI,1 > pL,
µ∗(pI,1) = I follows immediately, while p∗U,2(pI,1) = pLI + pH (1− I)follows
then by the same reasoning as in step 2.
Step 5: In any PBE and ∀ pI,1 < pL, either µ∗(pI,1) ≥ α and p∗U,2(pI,1) = pL
or µ∗(pI,1) < α and p∗U,2(pI,1) ≤ 2pL− pI,1.
Proof: Since pI,1 < pL is off the equilibrium path and because there are
no removed quantities to observe if Þrm u sets p∗U,1 = pL (which is us only
equilibrium choice), any beliefs µ(pI,1) are consistent with the observation
pI,1 < pL. However, for any beliefs µ(pI,1) ≥ α, p∗U,2(pI,1) = pL is the only
equilibrium response, as we have shown in the fourth paragraph of step 1
(note that Lemma 2 holds for any beliefs µ ≥ α).
Only if µ(pI,1) < α, p∗U,2(pI,1) > pL is a priori not excluded in equilibrium,
as becomes obvious if e.g. µ(pI,1) = 0. In this case, prices below pH being
dominated, Þrm u would set at least p∗U,2(pI,1) = pH . However, µ(pI,1) = 0
and p∗U,2(pI,1) = pH are not compatible with equilibrium behavior for all
pI,1 < pL. To see why, suppose p∗U,2(pI,1) = pH and µ(pI,1) = 0 for some
pI,1 = pL − z, where z is an abritrarily small positive number. Given this
reaction function, Þrm i will proÞtably set pIL,1 = pL− z and pIL,2 > pL+ z,
thereby contradicting the beliefs µ(pI,1) = 0. Clearly, p∗U,2(pI,1) = pH cannot
have been optimal for Þrm u in this case. Hence, even for pI,1 < pL, not
any combination of µ(pI,1) and pU,2(pI,1) can prevail in equilibrium. Only
beliefs µ∗(pI,1) implying reaction functions p∗U,2(pI,1) ≤ 2pL− pI,1 are feasible
in any PBE, since p∗U,2(pI,1) ≤ 2pL− pI,1 makes p∗IL,1 < pL (and p∗IH,1 < pL)
unproÞtable for Þrm i. This proves step Þve.
20
Step 6: The strategies σ∗I = {pL, pH , pL, pH} ,σ∗U = {pL, pLI + pH (1− I)}
and beliefs µ∗ (pI,1) = I constitute a PBE.
Proof: So far we have established that there can be no other PBE than
those stated in Proposition 1. This step makes sure that the strategy proÞles
and beliefs stated in Proposition 1 are indeed an equilibrium. While we prove
this for a certain set of beliefs µ∗ (pI,1) = I , ∀pI,1, it can be shown in an
equivalent way for all other feasible set of beliefs.
Consider Þrst Þrm u. In period 1 and given σ∗I , Þrm u faces with prob-
ability α a competitor which plays p∗IL,1 = pL and with probability (1 − α)
a competitor playing p∗IH,1 = pH . Because Þrm i can never learn anything
from observing prices of Þrm u, the latter need not take any second period
consequences into account when making its Þrst period decisions. For period
1, we can therefore refer to Lemma 2, which implies that Þrm u will have no
incentive to set a price higher than pL. But since setting a price p∗U,1 < pL is
strictly dominated in any case, p∗U,1 = pL is best answer to σ
∗
I .
In period 2, Þrm u can infer demand for any pI,1 > pL, such that the only
rational belief is µ∗(pI,1) = I. If I = 0, that is if demand is known to be high,
prices p∗U,2(pI,1) < pH are strictly dominated, and since Lemma 1 implies that
raising the price above pH is not optimal given p∗IH,2 = pH , it follows that
p∗U,2(pI,1) = pH is best answer to σ
∗
I for I = 0. For analogous reasons, Þrm u
has no incentives to deviate from p∗U,2(pI,1) = pL if demand is known to be low
(I = 0) and given σ∗I . This implies that given σ
∗
I , p
∗
U,2(pI,1) = pLI+pH (1− I)
is optimal for any pI,1 > pL. Next, if pI,1 = pL, µ∗(pI,1) = 1 is the only belief
consistent with σ∗I , and for any pI,1 < pL, µ
∗(pI,1) = 1 is also consistent
with σ∗I and Bayesian updating (if pI,1 < pL, any beliefs are feasible). Given
µ∗(pI,1) = 1 and by virtue of Lemma 1, p∗U,2(pI,1) = pL for pI,1 ≤ pL is best
answer to σ∗I . This establishes that p
∗
U,2(pI,1) = pLI + pH (1− I) for any pI,1
is Þrm us optimal response to σ∗I .
We now turn to the informed Þrm. Given the equilibrium reaction func-
tion p∗U,2(pI,1) of Þrm u, Þrm i would give up something in the Þrst period
without gaining anything in the second period if it chose a price pIL,1 < pL
or pIH,1 < pH . By virtue of Lemma 1, pIL,1 > pL or pIH,1 > pH is also in-
compatible with equilibrium behavior given σ∗U . This implies p
∗
IL,1 = pL and
p∗IH,1 = pH . In the second period, Lemma 1 (and again, the fact that lower
prices are strictly dominated) imply p∗IL,2 = pL and p
∗
IH,2 = pH , so that σ
∗
I is
strict best answer to σ∗U . This proves our Þnal step and thus completes the
proof of Proposition 1. Q.E.D
21
